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By Veronika Hásová 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this article is to demonstrate how religion—the set of traditions and the source of 
collective memory—is perceived in the Czech Republic by individuals with different levels of 
religiosity. The article concentrates on the way in which religion is perceived in an environment 
characterised by strong indifference to religious matters and a low level of declared religiosity. The 
paper asks whether religion in such an environment possesses the potential to stabilise (or to 
destabilise) society; it further compares whether the way religion is perceived by the community of 
traditionally religious people differs from the way it is perceived by people who practice alternative 
faiths.  
An analysis of ISSP 2008 data shows that there are rather negative perceptions of religion in 
the Czech Republic, and this view is influenced by the level of religiosity. Thus the more religious 
(alternatively or traditionally) people are, the more positive perceptions about religion they will 
hold. This study finds that controlled sociodemographic characteristics such as sex, age and 
education do not have any statistically significant influence on perceptions of religion. 
 
Keywords: religion, memory, secularisation, perception, alternative religiosity, traditional 
religiosity, Czech Republic 
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 Introduction 
The situation of traditions is very paradoxical in the modern world. Traditions are necessary for 
society for social cohesion; it is the essence of traditions that holds society together. If there were 
no traditions, people would always begin at the same point, and progress would be impossible. 
Many theorists claim that traditions are slowly disappearing from society. This disintegration of 
traditions is caused by the process of modernisation, as well as parallel processes such as 
individualisation, globalisation, consumerism and urbanisation.2 Furthermore, from the point of 
view of modernisation, traditions are not necessary for progress; on the contrary, they are barriers to 
it. 
Religion is a good example of a questionable and discussed tradition in the ‘modern’ world. 
Religion itself was a ‘great’ tradition that structured the lives of people and stabilised society for 
many years. Religion used to have a positive meaning for society that it has lost today. This shift in 
the thinking about religion may be seen as an influence of modernisation, in particular 
secularisation. The functions that religion once had have been transferred to different areas. The 
theory of secularisation has been contested in its original sense, however, and researchers are now 
trying to show that religion cannot entirely disappear.3 This challenge of secularisation in the 
context of rising uncertainty nationwide (in this case in the Czech Republic) should result in a 
rediscovery of the functions of religion, rather than its extinction. In other words, people might look 
to religion for the certainty that is currently missing in their lives.4  
The purpose of this article is to present how religion, as a set of traditions and a source of 
collective memory that provided social cohesion for a long time, is perceived in late modernity in 
the Czech Republic. The findings could contribute to answering the question of why and to what 
extent religion has or has not been re-discovered in the Czech Republic. Thus the theoretical part of 
the article focusses mainly on the meaning of religion and the relationship between religion and 
memory. The empirical part of the article presents the results of a regression analysis based on the 
data of ISSP 2008. 
 
 
Theory 
Religion: What did it once mean and what does it mean today? 
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The position of religion as a tradition that structures peoples’ lives has changed over time. In history 
we can find periods where people celebrated religion and periods where they criticised it. Although 
there is not room in this article to discuss each period from antiquity to the present, it is important to 
understand the context of modernity and post-modernity/late modernity, because these are principal 
periods connected with changing the meaning of religion in the present through debates about 
secularisation. 
The importance of modernity is that modernity itself can be seen as a ‘midwife of 
secularisation’.5 The tendency to a decrease of importance of religion that is well known from 
modernity began earlier, during the Enlightenment. This period of history was characterised by a 
belief in reason and progress; it replaced the belief in God with the belief in reason.6 Some early 
modern authors presupposed that religion would completely disappear from society, while others 
predicted that religion would be transformed. In other words, authors tried to describe what the role 
of religion would be in this new type of society. In this context, we can mention three key authors—
Émile Durkheim, Karl Marx and Max Weber. Marx refused religion in the sense that it was an 
ideological instrument and the ‘opium of mankind’7; this instrument would be unnecessary in a 
classless society. In his view, religion was an instrument of the elite for disciplining society.8 Weber 
connected religion with ‘disenchantment’ of the world when religion became only one type of 
social action.9 Durkheim presupposed the disappearance of religion, albeit only in its original form; 
still, he thought, it should be present in society in the form of rituals, which provide social cohesion. 
He also anticipated a rise of new activities and ceremonies that would replace the existing ones.10 
The ideas of these authors later became an integral part of theories of secularisation. 
The conception of secularisation is, however, quite problematic, because there are many 
theories of secularisation rather than one overarching theory. This is why the sociologist Roman 
Vido suggests using the term secularisation paradigm. The term paradigm is better for including a 
wide field of debates about secularisation, because it is collective (i.e. not individual), it stimulates 
scientific research and it does not need to have one overarching theory.11 In its original sense, 
secularisation should mean the gradual disappearance of religion from society. In late modernity 
this conception has not been tenable, and authors have stopped claiming in their theories that 
religion will completely disappear from society. According to the sociologist James Beckford, we 
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can distinguish six different streams of secularisation thoughts that form secularisation theories. The 
first stream is built on the thoughts of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, and partly on those of 
Émile Durkheim. The main idea of this stream of thought is a structural differentiation. Structural 
differentiation means that religion has become just one of many subsystems; one with very low 
influence. The second stream continues the thoughts of David Hume and other members of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, as well as the French encyclopaedists. An emphasis on empiricism and 
scientism is in the background of this stream of thought; religion is justified only in the form of 
‘original religion’ that is grounded in human reason. The third stream is based on the thoughts of 
Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsche; it accents the inner dynamics of religion and its transformation in 
the context of social and cultural changes. The fourth stream is connected with classic figures of 
liberalism such as John Stuart Mill and John Locke; it is based on the institutionalisation of religion 
and the problematisation of religious tolerance. The fifth stream is inspired by Marxism; this stream 
views religion as a part of an oppressive social system. The sixth and final stream refers to Sigmund 
Freud and his psychoanalytical theory, in which religion is viewed as a ‘collective neurosis’.12 The 
paradigm thus is useful to include this wide range of thoughts about secularisation.  
Meanwhile, theorists of secularisation abandoned thinking of secularisation as the 
disappearance of religion from society altogether, and tried to find new explanations13 in the sense 
of some transformation of religion, which sometimes implies a theory of individualisation. We can 
summarise these theories that, in agreement with secularisation theories, religion does have some 
place in society, but it is nevertheless greatly limited. Although religion is often associated with the 
private sphere, we often witness its presence in the public sphere; we speak about desecularisation 
and deprivatisation.14 Researchers have also responded to this, showing that religion does have 
some place in the public sphere.15  
This fragmentation of secularisation theory is a good example of trends in post-modernity, 
which is characterised by the rejection of clarity and a shift to plurality.16 A large number of 
different theories means that there are many opinions about the validity of secularisation in society. 
In other words, while some authors claim religion still has meaning (and thus there is no 
secularisation in the original sense), others still argue that society is still going through the process 
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of secularisation. The authors Peter Berger and Steve Bruce are good examples. Berger withdrew 
his theory of secularisation under changing circumstances. He problematises secularisation through 
the increase of fundamental religious movements, and due to the fact that the United States as a 
modern superpower is still quite religious.17 According to Berger, ‘the assumption that we live in a 
secularised world is false. The world today … is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some 
places more so than ever’.18 Bruce stands in opposition to Berger’s statements, finding them 
unsatisfactory; he justifies the theory of secularisation. Bruce sees a confirmation of secularisation 
in religious revival, not refusal; he also finds that alternative religiosity does not mean a denial of 
secularisation. As a result, people do not understand this alternative in the spiritual sense, nor are 
they very frequently in contact with it. In Bruce’s view, secularisation is a change in religion, which 
means a decrease of religion.19  
In the Czech context, there has also been ongoing debate about secularisation and the 
position of religion in society. The main topic of debate is whether or not the Czech Republic is an 
atheistic nation. Researchers have tried to explain the causes of the low level of religiosity in the 
country with four main explanations. The first is successful but superficial re-Catholisation after the 
Battle of White Mountain. The second is an anti-Catholic focus of national revival. The third is the 
refusal of clericalism connected with the acceptation of civic liberalism thinking by political 
representation. The fourth is the valued pragmatism of the majority. According to the scholar of 
religion David Václavík, the only correct explanation is one that combines religious behaviour with 
considerations of the deep economic, social and political changes that Czech society has undergone 
since the nineteenth century.20 The sociologist Petr Pabian also discusses the causes of the low level 
of religiosity; he connects it with communism, which had strong support in the Czech society and 
stood against only partly mobilised Catholicism. This led to an indifference to religious 
characteristics for Czech society.21 Although communism is a frequently used explanation, because 
the system attempted to do away with religion through strict repression, it is wrong to view the 
context of communism as a specific form of secularisation, because studies measuring religiosity 
have shown that the Czech Republic does not differ much from other countries in this regard. 
Ongoing processes affecting the nation are similar to processes happening in other European 
countries.22 
So far I have described the context that has influenced the perception of religion today. The 
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perception of religion is important because from history we know of cases when religion was 
reinvigorated if it could satisfy the needs of the people. Today, we live in a period characterised by 
a high level of uncertainty. We no longer blindly believe in the idea that progress is a guarantee of 
survival. In other words, we no longer believe in the idea that has systematically disturbed religious 
values and has caused us to move away from religion. The idea that modern societies would be able 
to ensure peoples’ safety and welfare has not proven to be the case. These circumstances should 
open some space for religion. Experiencing existential uncertainty, a sense of danger or desire for 
human contact and solidarity, or answering the question of why we exist are still important factors 
for individuals, and should be a reason for seeking religion or other spiritual forms.23 In other 
words, in late modernity, religion should become a renewed resource of certainty and stability in the 
sense of discovery of a ‘lost paradise’ in a religious community.24 But this can only be possible if 
religion overcomes a few barriers connected with modernity and the process of secularisation. 
The first challenge that needs to be resolved is disputes over the definition of religion. Bruce 
criticises post-modern approaches that argue that ‘religion’ is merely a modern construct as if there 
was contrasting category of naturally occurring nouns.25  
There are two main approaches to defining religion—functional and substantive. These 
perspectives are the key to determining the validity of secularisation. The functional definitions are 
very inclusive. According to these definitions, what religion does in society is important. In this 
sense, religion has several functions: for example, providing strategies to overcome problems that 
humans face in their daily lives (e.g. hopelessness, futility, despair and so on).26 Religion provides 
solutions to otherwise unanswerable questions of being, or it can bind people together in forms of 
collective action. The problem with these kinds of definitions is that they are too broad; thus, it is 
difficult to draw precise boundaries about what religion is or is not.27 That is why the sociologist 
and scholar of globalisation Roland Robertson claims that if we defined religion through a 
functional perspective, we could not speak about a decrease or weakening of religion, because this 
definition is so broad that it could include many phenomena such as nationalism, socialism and so 
on.28 Bruce even claims that functional definitions are not definitions of religion, but rather 
assertions about the consequences of religion substantively defined.29 He is an advocate for 
substantive definitions. In this approach, it is not important what religion does in society but rather 
what it is: what the ‘essence’ or the ‘substance’ is. The main feature of this definition is the 
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distinction between the sacred and the profane. This kind of definition is also problematic, however, 
because it directs researchers’ attention only to traditional forms of religion, whereas they overlook 
new forms of religiosity.30 In the context of secularisation, substantive definitions do not permit a 
change in substance when religion is changed: the change means a sign of secularisation. 
Sometimes the pursuit of defining religion hides what Bruce correctly highlights: ‘what is 
interesting about the strong-weak religion debate is that nothing hinged on the definition of 
religion’.31 The true importance of the approach to religion is operationalising, identifying and 
measuring the features of religion and of all the other social phenomena that we wish to deploy in 
our explanations.32 We have to bear in mind that ‘definitions are not mirrors of reality to be judged 
as “true” or “false” but are tools that can be seen by those who use them as more or less useful 
(Berger, 1997)’.33 
Another challenge lies in something that can be called the structural conditions of society. 
By this I mean barriers that determine thinking about religion in a particular society. There could be 
restrictions when people cannot declare their religiosity, or negative perceptions of religion when 
people do not declare religiosity due to social control: because it is not good to believe. In the 
Czech Republic, there is an idea that the cause for the discontinuity of religion is the set of 
structural conditions: for example, communism. This does not fully explain why the revival of some 
religious beliefs is still not possible. In other words, why people no longer look to religion during 
uncertain times, or why religion is not successful in meeting people’s needs. There have to be other 
reasons than political pressure; for example, a low level of trust in the Church when people prefer to 
remain without belief than re-accepting the teachings of the Church. ‘Institutions can be changed 
instantly. But people must forget and re-learn … In any case, people seem to change less quickly 
than institutions’.34  
Furthermore, the decline of believers could also be related to a negative perception of 
religion in our society: people connect religion with such negative factors as child abuse scandals, 
discrimination against homosexuals and terrorism.35 It is possible that non-religious affiliation (or 
participation in different traditions, including seemingly ‘distant’ alternatives) could be caused by 
legislative regulations (typical of a communist regime) or by scandals such as those that have 
plagued the Catholic Church.36 We need to know what the barriers are that cause weak religious 
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transmission. Why do all mothers not religiously socialise their children, and why are all children 
not believers when they reach adulthood? We need to determine why the new generation sees more 
de-conversion than conversion, and why there are ever-lower numbers of religious parents, and thus 
a decline in the numbers of believers.37  
One example of distancing from an idea of religion in the Czech context is the debate about 
sex education that took place in Czech schools in 2010. After the Ministry of Education published a 
brochure about sex education, there was a great public outcry against sex education in schools. 
These initiatives were likely successful because the religious discourse was replaced by a cultural 
discourse. The conservative cultural discourse was easier to accept than the religious discourse 
because of the lukewarm religious climate in the Czech Republic. The Christian right finds the most 
success in topics where it uses secular discourse: pseudoscientific arguments about physical and 
mental health, as well as therapeutic discourses on self-acceptance and self-improvement.38 Thus, 
people relate to religion when it is replaced by another discourse. 
I would like to deal with these challenges to some extent. First, for my analysis it is not 
important what the function or substance of religion is. I will use the survey’s data for analysis, 
operating with the assumption of an individual’s pre-understanding of the term religion. The 
important thing is the collective memory of the respondents, rather than precisely defining the term 
religion. The next chapter, as a result, is dedicated to the concept of memory in relation to religion. 
Second, in the analysis that follows I will try to determine if there are barriers in the perception of 
religion in the Czech Republic that impede its revitalisation, and whether or not these barriers are 
specific to a particular sector of society.  
 
Memory and Religion 
The concept of memory is gaining more and more attention in social science today.39 The historian 
François Hartog even takes the view that memory is a new paradigm in social science.40 An 
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increasing interest in this topic was characteristic of the 1970s; this increasing interest in memory 
was connected with the awareness of the extinction of vivid memories. This is because the 
generations that witnessed first-hand the crimes and catastrophes of the twentieth century are dying, 
taking these vivid memories with them.41 This situation implies that memory is bound to people. 
Memory is tied together with forgetting, which explains why collective memory is more reliable 
than individual memory. There have even been discussions of whether or not there is such a thing 
as individual memory. As the early twentieth-century sociologist and philosopher Maurice 
Halbwachs claimed, our memories rest collectively and are reminded to us by others, even if these 
memories are connected with events or things we have experienced or have seen alone. This is 
because we have never really been alone. In our lives we converse with others (for example, with 
architects, writers, artists and so on) to obtain different perspectives about something.42 
Furthermore, the Egyptologist Jan Assmann claims that it is difficult to distinguish ‘individual’ and 
‘social’ memory because the individual is always social to a high degree.43 This means that memory 
is rooted in society but is still in the process of transformation. Thus, to some extent memory is 
dependent upon context because we interpret memories that happened a long time ago differently 
under new circumstances due to our new experiences. Our appraisal of the past is relative, and thus 
so is memory; memory is also threatened by forgetting, as was mentioned earlier. Halbwachs 
explained forgetting as a process whereby an individual, as the owner of a particular memory, 
forgets something that does not have a concrete grounding in the present. In other words, when we 
cease to be a member of a group, memories that we shared together fade because they lack external 
impulses. The specific frame that held the memory has changed or disappeared.44 
 There are a few strategies that may moderate the process of forgetting. The first is holding 
memory within a group. A collective has a better chance of reconstructing memories than an 
individual does, because each individual in a group can remember something, and together they can 
describe their memories in more detail.45 In addition, people need bonds in order to develop 
memory, and memory is needed to form those bonds;46 this dialectic relation helps to hold 
collective memory. The second strategy is connecting memory to material objects when the main 
role of these material objects is to stop time and to preserve things as they were. Such places of 
memory would not exist if there were not the possibility to change and update their meanings. What 
we remember are not places of memory themselves, although they work as a place where memory 
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starts to put images of the past together into a story.47 And stories are always better for 
remembering than isolated memories are. 
Religious rituals are one of the oldest and most fundamental media for bonding memory.48 
For that reason, religion itself is one source or type of connective/collective memory. This idea 
helps to overcome the problem of defining religion, because religion is a specific mode of believing 
where a ‘chain’ and collective memory have a crucial role. The chain makes the individual believer 
a member of a community that incorporates past, present and future members. A collective memory 
then becomes the basis of that community’s existence. This explains why, when people are losing 
their memory, they are also losing traditional religion.49 We could remember some fragments of 
memories, however, and it does not matter if they refer to the substance or to the function of 
religion: we still use them and integrate them into other symbolic systems.50 This means that 
traditional religion is going through changes. 
In the Czech context, the collective memory of a sense of history is quite problematic. 
History does not seem to be important for many Czechs; very few people are actively interested in 
history.51 The problem is that people with a low level of historic knowledge could be more easily 
manipulated into believing historical misinterpretation (for example, misinterpretation of religious 
issues) which could lead to a decrease of the number of believers. The low level of religiosity in the 
Czech Republic could therefore be connected with a lack of interest in history. This is why memory 
is a good tool for analysing the transformation of religion (i.e. its continuity and discontinuities) or 
in something we can call religious memory.52 Continuity in religious memory can be interrupted by 
many effects that are more or less linked to each other: for example, hostile political regimes, such 
as communism; the failure of religious socialisation; and negative news about religion, such as 
religious scandals and religion-inspired terrorism. The discontinuity could also be due to an erosion 
of plausibility structures as a result of religious pluralism. When individuals feel cognitive 
dissonance because the truth they believe in is confronted with other truths—with the result that 
there is no longer one absolute truth—many truths can make individuals have doubts about their 
beliefs.53  
In such an environment, there is a need to preserve the continuity of memory (in particular, 
religious memory) in resources besides human resources. Religion can be kept, for example, in 
churches, books or electronic media, or it can be kept inherently in something that originally had 
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religious meaning and now has been replaced by another meaning, as some rituals, events or values. 
Although these media of religious memory are the elements that possess the potential to mobilise 
religion (by providing continuity in society), there must be an impulse—some activity—for 
mobilisation itself. There could be the problem of the vicious circle. There are some causes that 
weaken religion, and thus reduce the number of believers; the low number of believers then lacks 
the power to mobilise their religion, which then reinforces the causes that led to the decrease in 
believers in the first place. This is why I will analyse the perception of religion in the Czech 
Republic: it could reveal both the cause for the decrease in numbers of believers and the potential to 
mobilise religion. The findings should reveal which group or groups could be a carrier for this 
potential for mobilisation, and which barriers or other factors disturb the continuity of religious 
memory. 
 
Methods 
Data 
Data were collected from the Czech Sociological Data Archive. For the analysis, the data of the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2008 were used. A survey was created by stratified 
multistage random sampling. The sample size was 1,512 respondents who were at least 18 years 
old, permanently residing in the Czech Republic. Using data from this kind of survey does have 
some limitations; for example, respondents’ different understandings of the same question, 
answering according to expectations connected with the majority opinion in the country, biased 
memories of respondents and so on. Although there is no best solution for solving these limitations, 
there are approaches that reflect the limitations of the interpretations.54  
Another problem could be a forced reduction of the data sample because of data preparation. 
For example, in this analysis, a sample of 895 respondents was used. Almost 40 percent of the 
decrease of the respondents was due to deleting omitted observations in the variables that were used 
and data re-coding; nevertheless, the sample was still large enough to be analysed.55  
I formed a few composite variables for the analysis. The creation of variables can also be 
seen as problematic because the researcher can combine certain variables and not others, depending 
on, for example, the scale’s degree. Putting certain variables together meaningfully can raise some 
interesting and important findings, if it is possible to do so. The dependent variable, then, is religion 
perceived as a stabiliser [or destabiliser],56 and the composite independent variables are alternative 
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religiosity and traditional religiosity.57 There could be a question of which variables should be 
involved in alternative and traditional religiosity, but these independent variables are not new in 
research studies; their creation is inspired by previous research.58 The dependent variable was 
considered through the possibility of a survey (i.e. the questions that were asked) and theory. I 
chose variables that symbolise conflict as well as togetherness for several reasons. As was 
mentioned above, people need bonds in order to develop memory, and memory is needed to form 
those bonds.59 The variables practicing a religion helps people to make friends and practicing a 
religion helps people to meet the right kind of people are involved for this reason. Making friends 
and meeting the right kind of people relate to social cohesion: to forming the necessary bonds. The 
variables looking around the world, religions bring more conflict than peace and people with very 
strong religious beliefs are often too intolerant of others were also involved in the scale because 
these variables symbolise problems that could cause discontinuities in religious memory. The first 
pair of variables thus refer to the perception of religion as a stabilising factor, and the second pair as 
a destabilising factor. I obtained a scale that could at least partially indicate the possibility in 
keeping continuity, but also highlight discontinuity. The reduction to these four variables was due 
to the fact that I was limited by the resources of the data (ISSP 2008). I determined the Cronbach 
alpha to justify this selection of variables and found that it was reliable. The recommended value for 
the Cronbach alpha in the literature is 0.7, but this is connected with the number of items used in the 
scale. In other words, 0.7 is good for a five-point scale, but not for a scale with thirty items.60 The 
Cronbach alpha value of my composite variables was 0.72 for a four-point scale, which is good. If I 
included more variables, the value would have been higher, but it would not have been better. 
Therefore, the other independent variables are frequency of church attendance and if 
respondent declared some religiosity. These two variables were involved in the models because 
they helped to distinguish between active believers and passive believers, which might also affect 
the perception of religion in society. A few sociodemographic control variables were also used, 
such as age, sex and education; this is because previous research studies have shown positive 
results in including these variables. 
 
Analysis 
The perception of a subject has always been the domain of qualitative research studies, which is 
why a quantitative approach might seem odd in the context of the current study. I will demonstrate 
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that quantitative research can also bring interesting insights into this problem; it can also be an 
inspiration for future research.  
I used linear regression to test which variables influence the perception of religion as a 
stabiliser or destabiliser. I was also interested in the difference between ‘absolutely traditional 
believer [or non-believer]’ and ‘absolutely alternative believer [or non-believer]’. These categories 
approach the ideal types representing a person, who agree or disagree with all items on a scale 
measuring the independent variables of traditional or alternative religiosity. 
 I tested several regressive models. The first one included only control variables—sex, 
education and age—to check if they have a meaning to be involved in the models. Because each 
variable has at least some statistical significance, they were all included. I also tested models for 
alternative and traditional religiosity, as well as models that verify the influence of declared 
religiosity and the frequency of church attendance. I created models separately for alternative and 
traditional religiosity, as well as a model that tested their influence together.  
 Thus, I gradually involved independent variables to obtain one final model that included all 
variables combined for traditional religiosity, one for alternative religiosity, and one for both. I also 
examined models with various interactions, but there was no improvement; thus the interactions 
were not statistically significant. Statistical tests therefore determined that the best model was the 
model for both alternative and traditional religiosity together, and without the variable of declared 
religiosity. In addition, the best models for separated traditional and alternative religiosity were 
models without declared religiosity. The best models are presented in Table 1. 
 
 
 
Table 1:  Relationship between variables. Traditional and alternative religiosity and attendance at 
religious services, related to whether the religion was seen as an element that stabilises or destabilises 
society. Coefficients of ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression (standard error). (N = 895) 
 
 
Perception of religion (0: destabilisation—16: stabilisation) T_model A_model AT_model  
Traditional religiosity (0: non-believer–12: believer) 0.40***  0.30***  
 (0.04)  (0.04)  
Alternative religiosity (0: non-believer–12: believer)  0.30*** 0.23***  
  (0.03) (0.03)  
Frequency of church attendance (contrasted with: less than 
1 a year)   
  
      Now and then 0.61* 1.50*** 0.47n.s.  
 (0.30) (0.26) (0.29)  
      Several times a month 2.11*** 4.38*** 2.27***  
 (0.42) (0.31) (0.41)  
Sex (0=male, 1=female) 0.14n.s. 0.11n.s. -0.00n.s.  
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.18)  
Education (contrasted with: elementary)     
      Middle school - 0.03n.s. - 0.05n.s. 0.07n.s.  
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.19)  
      University 0.25n.s. 0.30n.s. 0.34n.s.  
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.31)  
Age (contrasted with: 18-29)     
      30-44 - 0.12n.s. 0.00n.s. -0.07n.s.  
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.28)  
      45-59 - 0.41n.s. - 0.21n.s. -0.23n.s.  
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.28)  
       60+ - 0.02n.s. 0.09n.s. 0.03n.s.  
 (0.29) (0.32) (0.28)  
     
Constant 5.55*** 4.75*** 4.68***  
   (0.29)  (0.31) (0.30)  
R2 36.02 % 35.01 % 39.64%  
F 55.35 54.51 58.05  
(df1:df2) (9; 885) (9; 885) (10;884)  
BIC 4374.54 4379.41 4329.15  
(df) 10   10 11  
Source: ČSDA, ISSP 2008; author’s calculations   
Note: †p <0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001   
Results 
Description 
Table 1 represents three models; the best is the model that includes traditional and alternative 
religiosity together (the AT_model). We first consider an effect of the variables traditional and 
alternative religiosity. These variables have a statistically significant (p<0.001) positive effect on 
the dependent variable perception of religion, which means the more people believe (traditional or 
alternative), the more positive meaning religion has for them. Then, the traditional religiosity (0.40) 
has a somewhat higher effect than alternative religiosity (0.30). What is interesting is that after 
putting together the variables traditional and alternative religiosity into one model (the AT_model), 
the effect of each variable decreases by almost 0.1, but the interaction of alternative and traditional 
religiosity has no effect; thus the model is not included in the table. We know the statistical 
significance, but the factual significance is more important. This means an ‘absolutely traditional 
believer’ differs from an ‘absolutely traditional non-believer’ by 4.80 points (T_model) and 3.60 
points (AT_model) on the 16-point scale. I consider this as factually significant for traditional 
religiosity, because more than half of the sample is concentrated at the end of the scale (values 0 
and 1).61 The effect of alternative religiosity is weaker: 3.60 points (A_model) and 2.76 points 
(AT_model). The factual significance is also weaker, because ‘absolutely alternative believers’ and 
‘absolutely alternative non-believers’ have lower representation in this sample.62 
Furthermore, in Table 1 we can see the effect of the variable frequency of church 
attendance. This variable is highly statistically significant (p<0.001) only in the category several 
times a month; and, in the context of alternative religiosity (A_model), also in the category now and 
then. In this model (A_model) the coefficients of the variable are the highest. In the third model 
(AT_model), an effect of the category now and then completely disappears (p>0.1), but the effect of 
the category several times a month remains. Again, the tested interactions have no influence, so 
there is a specific relation in the data that I cannot control. The effect of 4.38 points in the category 
several times a month (A_model) is also factually significant, but we can also expect that people 
who tend to observe alternative religions do not often attend church. In addition, the effect 2.27 
(AT_model) can be considered as being factually significant, but only slightly. This means a person 
who attends church several times a month values religion more positively (by 2.27 points on the 16-
point scale perception of religion) than a person who attends church less than once a year. 
Some important results are connected with the sociodemographic characteristics. We can see 
that in these models, which statistical tests have found to be the best ones, the variables sex, 
education and age have no statistically significant effect on the perception of religion. In other 
words, after including the dependent variables traditional religiosity, alternative religiosity and 
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church attendance, the effects of the sociodemographic characteristics disappear (p>0.1), and we 
might not expect it in reality. This is why I have also tested a model with various interactions, but 
none were statistically significant. This could mean that the negative perception of religion is not 
connected with a specific sector of the population, but rather is shared throughout society. 
In conclusion, traditional and alternative religiosity are highly statistically (and factually) 
significant, as is church attendance several times a month. Other effects are not statistically 
significant, which means we cannot expect the hinted-at effects of church attendance now and then, 
age, education and sex in reality. We can also summarise that R2 indicates that the perception of 
religion is influenced by other effects/variables that were not controlled for in these models, and 
that there is room for further analysis. 
 
Reflection on the results 
In the previous section I described the results from the linear regression. In this section I would like 
to go beyond the description to some extent and to delve more deeply into these findings, or at least 
to provide some ideas about the results. I would like to avoid the mistake made by many research 
studies, which is to only describe the results.63  
At first, I would like to focus on what could tell us similar effects of traditional and 
alternative religiosity. As was discussed above, the effect of traditional religiosity was higher than 
the effect of alternative religiosity, but in both cases the effect was that the more people believe, the 
more positive meaning religion has for them. It is not surprising that traditional believers give more 
positive meaning to religion, but what I consider to be important is the similarity between 
alternative and traditional religiosity. That is why there are some criticisms and doubts about using 
alternative religiosity as an indicator of religiosity in society, because people do not value particular 
items of alternative religiosity as being spiritual. The similar effect on the perception of religion, 
however, could indicate that the function of alternative religiosity is similar to that of traditional 
religiosity, and thus it could be used as such an indicator. In other words, the consistency of items 
for measuring alternative religiosity is reliable according to the Cronbach’s alpha, and the effect of 
the compound variable is similar to the effect of traditional religiosity. The statement about the 
usefulness of alternative religiosity as an indicator would need further, detailed enquiry, however. 
For example, more studies comparing the effects of both types of religiosity on other topics that 
were not covered in this study are necessary. 
The main finding is that there is a rather negative perception of religion in the Czech 
Republic. There could be many reasons for this. One of the causes can be, for example, a restrictive 
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political regime such as communism, as was mentioned earlier. Another cause could be connected 
with the media. A first example is the case of restitution of the Church’s assets lost during the 
communist era, which people feel strongly about.64 In this case the Church did not accurately 
estimate the social mood regarding restitutions, and people came to view this topic rather 
negatively. The common view of the Church as a source for moral authority shifted to that of an 
authoritative and greedy power.65 In other words, an attempt to retrieve all of the property of the 
Church became a negative symbol for religion itself. Many people, even believers, claimed that the 
Church should not get its property back.66 A second example is the negative perceptions of religion 
connected with the news about terrorism and similar topics. The media form negative images of 
various religions, sometimes using terms that are misinterpreted,67 and the negativity results in a 
decrease of trust in the Church; it is also projected onto the perception of religion itself.  
The problem is that the negative perception of religion does not change even in a society 
that is permeated by uncertainty. Religion has not yet offered satisfying functions for society. There 
could be several reasons for this. The first reason is that the Church does not have effective 
strategies to change this atmosphere of negativity. The Church would like to shift people’s attention 
to certain topics, but it fails in putting these topics into the public agenda.68 Thus, there are still the 
same negative topics about religion in the public agenda, and new, positive, topics are not being 
created. The second reason is the aforementioned vicious circle, by which I mean the dialectic 
relation between the number of believers and the image of the religion—the higher the number of 
believers, the more positive the religion’s image. The negative perception of religion thus could be 
one of the barriers that causes a low level of religiosity in Czech society, and the low number of 
believers is the cause of the negative perception. In other words, there is no capacity that could shift 
such a perception of religion today. The group that should be a carrier of religion—the group that 
should have the potential to change the perception of religion—is small. There are no such large 
numbers of alternatively religious or traditionally religious believers with such power in Czech 
society. Even such conditions could explain the failure of religious socialisation. People do not 
bring their children up to be religious because it has been mostly seen as a problem in society. 
To summarise, religion is not the key to overcoming uncertainty in Czech society due to 
certain barriers; one of these barriers is its negative perception. This does not mean that religion 
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does not have a function in society. Research studies have shown that religion is still important for 
society. In addition, people have not had problems with religious features that have been replaced 
by different discourses; this means that religion resonates in the memory of Czechs in the sense of 
inherent religiosity. By this I mean a set of beliefs, rituals or values that originally came from 
religion, but no longer have a religious sense. It is hard to identify such features: for example, the 
debate about sex education at Czech schools or the popularity of visiting famous religious buildings 
for non-religious reasons. Therefore, there is religious memory in Czech society, but it is weakened 
by the negative perception of religion and other causes. People rather cover (perhaps unconsciously) 
the religious meaning of various features. Still, there is the possibility of a renewal of religion 
because various media still hold the continuity of religious memory. 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
We can conclude that the position of religion is quite problematic in the Czech Republic. The 
analysis undertaken for this study proves that a prevailing negative perception of religion is shared 
throughout Czech society regardless of sex, age or education. The negative perception could be seen 
as one of the causes of the discontinuity of religious memory. While some continuity of religious 
memory should be seen in the groups of traditional and alternative believers, these groups are not 
robust enough to change the negative opinions of the majority towards religion. The problem here is 
that there is a lack of willingness to raise children in a religious manner in a society where there is 
such a negative perception of religion. We have to bear in mind, of course, that this lack of 
religiosity has many causes. 
Negative perception of religion could be one of the barriers that impede religion from 
becoming a source of certainty in a society that is permeated by uncertainty. People are instead 
seeking other resources. For example, non-religious communities can function as one such resource. 
Various communities can satisfy people’s needs today better than religious communities can. This 
is because the idea of community has a more positive meaning than religion for many people.69 
Community is not a reflexive term that society uses for itself, however.70 
Therefore, although there is a low level of religiosity found in the Czech Republic today, 
still it seems that people need religion in some form or another. The findings of other research 
studies indicate that secularisation only affects some layers of memory, while other layers of 
memory remain. This article opens the way for further research, which could determine the sources 
of negative perceptions of religion, and what layers resist secularisation and why they do so. Further 
studies could also examine in detail the usefulness of alternative religiosity as an indicator of 
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religiosity. In addition, this article shows that questions that are most often examined by qualitative 
research can be analysed by quantitative methods to some extent; these quantitative methods can 
produce important findings and can highlight interesting topics for further research. 
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 Apendix 
- Table 2. The construction of variables 
- Table 3 and 4. The characteristics of dependent variables 
 
 
 
 
The construction of variables 
 
Table 2. The construction of variables – religion perceived as a traditional (de)stabilizer, traditional religiosity and 
alternative religiosity. 
Name of constructed variable Name of original variable 
Looking around the world, religions bring more conflict 
than peace 
Religion perceived as a (de)stabilizer 
People with very strong religious beliefs are often too 
intolerant of others 
(CA = 0.72) 
Practicing a religion helps people to make friends (reverse 
scale) 
Practicing a religion helps people to meet the right kind of 
people (reverse scale) 
    
Do you believe in heaven? 
Traditional religiosity Do you believe in hell? 
(CA = 0.93) Do you believe in religious miracles? 
There is a God who concerns himself with every human 
being personally 
    
Good luck charms sometimes do bring good luck 
Alternative religiosity Some fortune tellers really can foresee the future 
(CA = 0.87) Some faith healers do have God-given healing powers 
  
A person´s star sign at birth, or horoscope, can affect the 
course of their future 
 
 
 The characteristics of independent variables – traditional and alternative religiosity 
 
Table 3. The characteristics of variable - traditional religiosity. 
 
 
Traditional religiosity Absolute frequency Relative frequency 
0 284 31.73 % 
1 186 20.78 
2 78 8.72 
3 51 5.70 
4 73 8.16 
5 26 2.91 
6 29 3.24 
7 25 2.79 
8 43 4.80 
9 20 2.23 
10 14 1.56 
11 25 2.79 
12 41 4.58 
Total 895 100% 
 
 
Table 4. The characteristics of variable - alternative religiosity. 
 
 
Alternative religiosity Absolute frequency Relative frequency 
0 115 12.85 % 
1 57 6.37 
2 63 7.04 
3 70 7.82 
4 124 13.85 
5 68 7.60 
6 99 11.06 
7 88 9.83 
8 91 10.17 
9 45 5.03 
10 24 2.68 
11 22 2.46 
12 29 3.24 
Total 895 100 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
